Author moral rights: different approaches in civil and common law

Last updated: September 2026 — by Avv. Claudia Roggero, Rome Bar since 2003, entertainment and copyright law, DANDI.media

The same act can be lawful in one country and unlawful in another, on identical facts, because of a divergence that is philosophical before it is technical. Shostakovich lost in the United States and won in France over the same film. Beckett’s estate stopped a production of Waiting for Godot in Paris that would have run untouched in London.

Moral rights are where the civil law and common law traditions part company most sharply. This guide sets out why they diverge, what each system actually grants, and how the difference plays out in the cases that have shaped the field — in music, theatre, sculpture, architecture and film.

What moral rights are

Moral rights are the rights an author holds over the personal connection with their work, distinct from the economic rights to exploit it. They ordinarily comprise:

• Paternity — the right to be identified as the author, or to remain anonymous;
• Integrity — the right to object to modification, mutilation or distortion prejudicing the author’s honour or reputation;
• Disclosure — the right to decide whether and when the work is first made public;
• Withdrawal — in some civil law systems, the right to remove the work from circulation in defined circumstances.

They protect non-economic interests acquired by virtue of the creative act. In the civil law tradition they are classified as a species of personality right: what is protected is the author as a person, not only the work as property.

Where they come from

The concept took shape in nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, and France is its birthplace. Droit moral developed there as a body of rights distinct from economic copyright, and the civil law countries of continental Europe built on that model.

The founding premise is that moral rights are not created by legislation but recognised by it. They derive from natural law reasoning about the relationship between a creator and their creation, and the statute codifies something taken to exist already.

That premise has never been generally accepted in common law systems, and the consequences run through everything that follows.

The philosophical divergence: person or property

The difference between the two traditions rests on what the legislator places at the centre: the individual, or the object.

The subjective view

Focuses on the artist as a person and on their feelings, disregarding the work itself. Taken to its conclusion it would give an author a right of action against an unkind critic — which is precisely why it has never been adopted in pure form. The objection is obvious: feelings are hurt constantly, and a right founded on hurt feelings is a right without boundaries.

The objective view

More empirical, and the one that actually prevailed in Europe. The work becomes part of the author, externalised into an object that represents them. Any affront to the work is therefore a direct affront to the author.

This is what explains the perpetuity of moral rights in civil law systems, which otherwise looks arbitrary. If the work is part of the author, the author survives in the work — and an alteration after death is an aggression against someone who is still, in the relevant sense, present. Heirs do not inherit a right so much as continue to defend a person.

The common law tradition took the other road: copyright as an economic incentive to create and disseminate, the work as a transferable commodity, and the author’s interest principally financial. Moral rights in that framework are either narrow, waivable, or displaced onto adjacent doctrines — defamation, unfair competition, passing off.

The two systems compared

The bottom row is the one that decides most cross-border disputes. US federal moral rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act reach works of visual art and do not extend to film. A US production has, in its home jurisdiction, no integrity right to breach — and every integrity claim against it must therefore be brought elsewhere.

The cases that define the field

The divergence is easiest to see where the same facts produced opposite outcomes.

Shostakovich: the same music, two answers

In Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox the composer’s claim against the use of his score in a US anti-Soviet film was rejected by the American courts in 1948 and 1949: the right to artistic integrity as argued simply did not exist in law.

In France, in Le Chant du Monde v. Twentieth Century Fox, a court prohibited the same use. Same music, same film, opposite results — and the explanation is not that one court was more sympathetic, but that one legal system recognised the right and the other did not.

Beckett: the performance and the work become one

In 1992 a French court held a theatre director liable for infringing Samuel Beckett’s right of integrity by staging Waiting for Godot with the two lead roles played by women, contrary to Beckett’s stage directions.

The reasoning matters beyond theatre: exercise of a moral right over a performance is justified because, from the audience’s point of view, the work and the performance become one. That logic reaches directly into film dubbing, re-editing and AI modification of performances.

George Michael: remix as derogatory treatment

In 1993 the Court of Appeal in London granted an injunction preventing release of the Bad Boys Megamix, a medley of Wham! material. The court found it arguable that the remix constituted derogatory treatment — capable of being a distortion or mutilation of the songs.

A useful corrective to the idea that common law systems give nothing: the UK regime is real, it simply operates within a term and can be waived. In this instance it had not been.

Buffet: where the work ends

In the 1962 Buffet v. Fersing case, Bernard Buffet had painted across six panels of a single refrigerator and signed only one of them. The buyer disassembled it and sold the panels separately.

The French court held that the single signature evidenced his intention that the work be understood as a whole, and awarded damages for breach of the integrity right. The case defines something no statute can: the boundaries of a work are set by the author’s creative intention, not by the physical object’s capacity to be taken apart.

Snow: the geese and the ribbons

In Snow v. Eaton Centre (1982) a Canadian shopping centre draped decorative ribbons over the necks of an artist’s sculpted geese for the Christmas season. The artist succeeded in a claim for breach of integrity.

Nothing was damaged and nothing was permanent — which is exactly the point. Integrity can be breached by addition and by context, not only by alteration. For anyone placing a work in a commercial setting, that is the case to remember.

Huston: colourisation and the limits of contract

The best-known instance concerns the colourisation of black-and-white films. John Huston’s heirs lost in the United States and won in France, where the Cour de Cassation held in 1991 that colourisation breached the inalienable integrity right, applying French law to exploitation in France regardless of the US contractual structure.

It established the proposition that governs cross-border practice: moral rights attach to acts of exploitation in the jurisdiction, whatever the contract’s choice of law. See our dedicated case study.

Berne: a common floor, divergent implementation

Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires every signatory to recognise at least the rights of paternity and integrity. Virtually every major country is a signatory, including the United States since 1989.

Yet the divergence persists, because Berne sets a floor and not a method. Civil law states implement through inalienable regimes. Common law states implement narrowly — rights that can be waived, limited to certain categories of work, or left to adjacent doctrines. The United States has long maintained that its existing body of law satisfies the obligation.

A shared treaty with divergent implementation is the structural reason international productions get caught.

What this means in practice

Three consequences follow for anyone working across the divide.

1. A waiver clause does not travel. A moral rights waiver valid under the CDPA, or a work-for-hire structure effective under US law, has no effect on exploitation in Italy or France. Including one does not solve the problem — it obscures the fact that the problem was never addressed.

2. The place of exploitation decides, not the place of contracting. Every territory in a distribution plan applies its own rules to acts taking place there. A single global clearance position is not available on this point.

3. What works instead is limitation plus approval. A clause under which the author undertakes not to invoke specified moral rights in specified commercial contexts, combined with a mechanism by which the author approves particular modifications case by case. Slower than a waiver, and unlike a waiver it is enforceable.

For the audiovisual application of all this — Article 44 co-authorship, the director’s position, dubbing, restoration and AI — see our moral rights in film guide. For the comparative position on film authorship specifically, see civil law vs common law copyright in film.

Frequently asked questions

What are moral rights?

The rights an author holds over the personal connection with their work, distinct from the economic rights: paternity, integrity, disclosure, and in some systems withdrawal. In the civil law tradition they are classified as personality rights, protecting the author as a person rather than only the work as property.

Why do civil law and common law treat moral rights so differently?

Because they place different things at the centre. Civil law treats the work as an externalisation of the author, so an affront to the work is an affront to the person — which is why the rights are inalienable and perpetual. Common law treats copyright as an economic incentive and the work as a transferable commodity, leaving moral rights narrow, waivable, or handled through adjacent doctrines.

Can moral rights be waived?

In Italy, France and Germany, no: a waiver is void. In the United Kingdom, yes, by signed agreement, and in commercial practice they usually are. In the United States federal moral rights exist only for works of visual art under VARA and do not reach audiovisual works at all.

How long do moral rights last?

In Italy and France they are perpetual, surviving the author’s death indefinitely and enforceable by heirs. In the United Kingdom they run for the same term as the economic rights. Under VARA they last for the author’s life, and only for the covered categories.

Do US moral rights cover films?

No. VARA applies to works of visual art. Audiovisual works fall outside the federal moral rights regime, which is why integrity claims concerning US films have historically been brought in Europe instead.

What was the Shostakovich case?

The composer objected to the use of his score in a US anti-Soviet film. The American courts rejected the claim in 1948 and 1949 because the integrity right argued for did not exist in law. A French court prohibited the same use. Same music, same film, opposite outcomes.

Can a moral right be breached without damaging the work?

Yes. In Snow v. Eaton Centre a Canadian shopping centre draped ribbons over an artist’s sculpted geese for Christmas. Nothing was damaged and nothing was permanent, and the artist still succeeded: integrity can be breached by addition and by context, not only by alteration.

Does the Berne Convention not harmonise this?

Article 6bis requires signatories to recognise at least paternity and integrity, but it sets a floor rather than a method. Civil law states implement through inalienable regimes, common law states through narrower and often waivable ones. The shared treaty with divergent implementation is precisely why cross-border disputes arise.

Which law applies to a film made in the US and distributed in Italy?

For acts of exploitation in Italy, Italian law determines whether moral rights have been infringed, regardless of how the underlying contracts were structured or which law governs them. This is the principle established in the Huston litigation.

How DANDI supports authors and producers

• Moral rights advisory for authors, performers, producers and heirs
• Adaptation of foreign contracts — replacing void waivers with limitation and non-exercise clauses plus approval mechanisms
• Cross-border structuring where a project spans jurisdictions with different regimes
• Modification clearance — colourisation, dubbing, restoration, re-editing, AI modification
• Heir representation in posthumous integrity and attribution claims
• Disputes before the Italian specialised IP chambers, and coordination with foreign counsel

We work in English, Italian and French, and are regularly instructed by foreign law firms on the Italian-law position within a wider matter.

Book an initial consultation with Avv. Claudia Roggero.

Related guides

This guide states the position at the date above. Confirm current provisions before relying on it for a specific matter.

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